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  1ABSTRACT 
The unpredictable nature of emergent markets implies that ventures entering such markets are confronted with 
technological and commercial uncertainty. Defining a viable business model under such circumstances is a 
complex and precarious endeavour. Previous research has either advanced the idea of focus – in order to attract 
resources and realize first mover advantages – or sequential experimentation financed through bootstrapping, 
implying limited resources during initial phases of the venture. As such, a trade-off between flexibility and 
resource acquisition has been introduced.  Within this contribution we explore how ventures starting up in 
emergent industries can balance the attainment of financial resources with flexibility and business model 
adaptation. Based on a sequence analysis of six case studies, we identify two distinctive approaches to business 
development in emergent industries: focused commitment versus simultaneous experimentation. Our findings 
reveal that focused commitment is instrumental for acquiring resources but at the same time impedes flexibility, 
while simultaneous experimentation allows to attract resources while maintaining manoeuvring space for 
business model adaptation. An analytical comparison of both approaches suggests that simultaneous 
experimentation is indeed a more viable strategy when entering emergent industries. 
  2INTRODUCTION 
Successful exploitation of an entrepreneurial opportunity requires the development of a business 
model, which translates the opportunity into particular configurations that create and capture value 
(Amit and Zott, 2001; Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). However, for ventures in emergent 
industries, this is not straightforward. Emergent industries are characterized by considerable levels of 
uncertainty both in terms of technical and market feasibility (Karlsson and Nyström, 2003; Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990). As a consequence, the set of feasible opportunities and interesting business 
models is often not predictable in advance and the ones envisaged are of a highly conditional nature 
(Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; Alvarez and Barney, 2007).  
Within highly uncertain settings opportunities can be enacted by experimenting with business 
models and redefining them based on consumer and market reactions (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). 
When business models are still under development, ‘bootstrapping’ including acquiring financial 
resources from ‘fools, family and friends’ have been identified as instrumental to finance these business 
model changes (Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Bhide, 1992; Winborg and Landström, 1997, 2001). 
However, these funding mechanisms limit investment possibilities during the first, ‘fluid’,  phase of the 
venture, eventually jeopardizing the enactment of opportunities. An alternative approach to opportunity 
creation in emergent industries implies commitment to a specific business model (Garud and Van de 
Ven, 1992; Choi, Lévesque and Shepherd, 2008). While such commitment may be instrumental for 
realizing first-mover advantages and facilitates the mobilisation of resources, it is not clear whether it 
sufficiently allows for flexibility in case the chosen business model turns out to be unviable. This raises 
the question how entrepreneurial ventures in emergent industries can strike a balance between 
conflicting demands – creating a clear and convincing vision and commitment towards investors while 
maintaining sufficient levels of flexibility – when developing their business model. 
  3In this paper, we perform a sequence analysis of six in-depth case studies of growth-oriented 
companies. We observe the use of two distinctive approaches to business model development in 
emergent industries: ‘focused commitment’ and ‘simultaneous experimentation’. Both approaches differ 
in terms of rationale and implications for funding and for flexibility in terms of business model 
development. Whereas ventures using focused commitment clearly sacrifice flexibility in return for 
financial investments and expected first-mover advantages, planned experimentation with multiple 
business models in parallel – which differs from the sequential experimentation approach discussed in 
existing literature - allows ventures to attract external investments while at the same time maintaining 
manoeuvring space for business model changes. Our work contributes to the existing literature on 
opportunity creation, experimentation, and effectuation. It also bridges the seeming contrast between 
‘planning’ and ‘action’.  
In the remainder of the paper, we first outline the theoretical background of the study with respect 
to the development of business models in emergent industries. In a subsequent section, we discuss the 
research design adopted. We then outline in detail the insights obtained from in-depth case studies. 
Finally, by means of an analytical model, we explore the relevancy of both approaches for 
entrepreneurial ventures in emergent markets. We conclude by discussing implications, limitations and 
directions for future research.  
BACKGROUND 
Entrepreneurial opportunities 
Entrepreneurial opportunities have been defined as ‘situations in which new goods, services, raw 
materials, markets and organizing methods can be introduced through the formation of new means, 
ends, or means-ends relationships’ (Eckhardt and Shane, 2003, p. 336). These opportunities arise 
when competitive imperfections exist in the market. Many entrepreneurship scholars have assumed 
that these market imperfections come into existence because of changes in the venture’s environment, 
  4such as technological changes, political and regulatory changes, as well as consumer preferences 
(Shane, 2003). This implies that the entrepreneurial venture searches for, identifies and then exploits 
an existing opportunity. However, other authors have advocated that competitive imperfections do not 
only arise exogenously, but can also be created by the entrepreneurial venture (for an excellent 
overview, see Alvarez and Barney, 2007 and Zahra, 2008). The actions, reactions, and enactment of 
entrepreneurs create entrepreneurial opportunities (see also the social constructionist view of Weick, 
1979). Whether the entrepreneurial venture identifies or creates potential entrepreneurial opportunities, 
its performance will depend on exploiting the right entrepreneurial opportunities (Zahra, 2008).  
 
The business model 
Exploiting opportunities requires the development of a business model, which translates opportunities 
into particular configurations that create and capture value (Amit and Zott, 2001; Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002). Sources of value creation have been discussed from different angles and 
perspectives. Transaction-cost economics considers transaction efficiency as a major way of reducing 
costs and, consequently, as a source of value creation (Barney, 1999; Williamson, 1975, 1981). 
Porter’s (1985) value chain framework explores both the primary and the support activities of the firm. 
In this view, value can be created by organizing every activity so that it lowers buyers’ costs or raises 
buyers’ utility. The resource-based view and the dynamic-capabilities emphasize the importance of 
combining and developing a set of scarce, durable and difficult to imitate resources and capabilities, 
resulting in value creation (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Barney, Wright, and Ketchen, 2001). 
Research on strategic networks has focused on the density, centrality, size, and governance of 
company networks as drivers of value creation (Jarillo, 1995; Dyer and Singh, 1998).  
The concept of the business model allows to encompass these different perspective on value 
creation by explicitly incorporating a variety of constituents of value creation (Amit and Zott, 2001). A 
business model can be defined as “a concise representation of how an interrelated set of decision 
  5variables in the areas of venture strategy, architecture, and economics are addressed to create 
sustainable competitive advantage in defined markets” (Morris, Schindehutte and Allen, 2005, pp. 727). 
A business model is a construct that mediates the value creation process by selecting and filtering 
technologies and ideas, and translating them into particular configurations that can be offered to a 
chosen target market (Teubal, Yinnon and Zuscovitch, 1991). A company’s business model consists of 
different components, representing value creation potential from multiple sources. The most 
consistently emphasized components (see Morris et al., 2005) concern (a) the value proposition or 
offering, (b) the customer (including type of customer and geographical area), (c) the economic factor, 
the revenue model, or how the firm makes money, and (d) the internal processes and competencies, 
including production/operations, sales/marketing, information management, technology, finance, supply 
chain management, and networking (see also Magretta, 2002; and Hamel, 2000). 
 
Uncertainty in emergent markets 
Ventures are generally confronted with risk when exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities. A decision-
making context is risky if the venture can gather sufficient information to identify possible outcomes 
associated with a decision, as well as the probability distribution of those outcomes. Some ventures 
however, face not just mere risk, but uncertainty. Uncertainty – also called ‘Knightian uncertainty’ – has 
been defined as characteristic of a situation in which probability distributions are not known (Knight, 
1921; Cohen and Winn, 2007). The problem solver understands the structure of the problem, including 
the set of relevant decision variables, but does not know the exact values these variables should take 
(Schrader, Riggs and Smith, 1993)1. A difference therefore exists between the amount of information 
available and the amount of information required to execute a task at hand (Galbraith, 1977)2.  
                                                 
1 Note that the notion of uncertainty differs from the notion of risk. In situations of risk, probability distributions are 
known. 
2 Economists have developed several ways of modeling Knightian uncertainty – for example, as a probability 
distribution of probability distributions, by using non-additive expected utilities, and by using subjective expected 
utility theory (for an overview, see Camerer & Weber, 1992). 
  6Especially within emergent industries, new ventures are confronted with uncertainty regarding 
their business model. Within emergent industries, the nature and the outcome of the technical activities 
are inherently unpredictable and technological options are at best marginally understood (Simon and 
Houghton, 2002; Steensma et al., 2000; Dowell and Swaminathan, 2006); market selection forces are 
yet unclear (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Autio and Lumme, 1998; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Saemundsson and Lindholm Dahlstrand, 2005); distribution 
channels and sources of supply are problematic, market needs are not clearly defined and, thus, 
market viability cannot be defined a priori (see Abernathy and Utterback, 1975; Abernathy 1978; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Bhide, 1996; Teubal et al., 1991). What the market will become 
depends on a multitude of decisions by a variety of stakeholders, and clarity will only arise when 
entrepreneurial activities resulted in the development of the industry (Dutta and Crossan, 2005). Stated 
otherwise, the feasibility of any business model in emergent markets cannot be predicted with certainty 
ex ante (Buchanan and Vanberg, 1991; Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004).  
 
Developing business models in emergent markets 
Enacting opportunities within such emerging industries hence present itself as a complex and 
hazardous enterprise in which experimenting with and redefining business models -  based on 
consumer and market reactions – seems highly instrumental (Alvarez and Barney, 2007). Through 
experimentation, the original idea can be adapted into a viable business model through “a series of trial 
and error changes pursued along various dimensions” (Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper and Woo., 2000, p. 
496). By experimenting with specific business models and incorporating feedback from the 
environment, entrepreneurial ventures adopt an active stance towards learning about the environment 
(Simon and Houghton, 2002). If outcomes are negative, the initial business model is redefined and a 
new experiment is launched (Garud and Van de Ven, 1992; Minniti and Bygrave, 2001; Chakravarthy, 
1982, Lichtenstein, Dooley and Lumpkin., 2006; Shepherd, Douglas and Shanley, 2000). This approach 
  7implies that ventures will deviate from their initial business model as they incorporate information that 
becomes available during the entrepreneurial trajectory (Hmieleski and Corbett, 2008; Gruber, 
MacMillan and Thompson, 2008; Corbett, 2007). While such a sequential development path seems 
highly appropriate to deal with the uncertainty and unpredictability of emergent industries, it remains 
less clear how this approach can convince stakeholders – and more specifically investors – to support 
and strengthen the entrepreneurial venture during the – sometimes lengthy – experimental 
development period. After all, research has shown that investors are not likely to finance 
reconfigurations, since they often cannot know whether the initial business model was wrong or 
whether it was poorly executed (Bhide, 1992). If the latter seems plausible to them, they will not take 
the risk of investing in the venture again. Given VCs’ aversion, ‘bootstrapping’ including the use of 
financial resources from ‘fools, family and friends’ is often used to finance these business model 
changes (Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Bhide, 1992; Winborg and Landström, 1997, 2001). However, 
these funding mechanisms pose problems in the sense that investment possibilities during the first 
phase of the venture are limited, and that growth needs to be kept under strict control, which possibly 
jeopardizes the enactment of some interesting opportunities (Bhide, 1992; 2000).  
Earlier research has proposed an alternative approach to opportunity creation in emergent 
industries. It implies commitment to the initial business model (Garud and Van de Ven, 1992; Van de 
Ven and Polley, 1992; Choi, Lévesque and Shepherd, 2008). Such early commitment may be 
instrumental in realizing first-mover advantages (Choi et al., 2008) and may help to convince investors 
more easily (Garud and Van de Ven, 1992). It allows for routinized behaviour, which in turn enables the 
venture to effectively handle liabilities of newness and to invest in relationships with important 
stakeholders such as customers and suppliers (Shepherd et al., 2000, Stinchcombe, 1965). It is 
obvious that such alignment with investors and other stakeholders could facilitate the co-creation and 
enactment of the entrepreneurial opportunity (Weick, 1979). However, existing research does not 
discuss how the venture is affected if the entrepreneurial opportunity to which it has committed, turns 
  8out to be unprofitable. So, although this committed approach allows for growth-oriented entrepreneurial 
activities, it is not clear whether this approach sufficiently allows for flexibility in case the chosen 
business model turns out to be unviable (Andries & Debackere, 2007).  
In this contribution, we therefore focus on how entrepreneurial ventures in emergent industries 
can strike a balance between conflicting demands – creating a clear and convincing vision and 
commitment towards investors while maintaining sufficient levels of flexibility – when developing their 
business model. Given that we want to explore how new ventures in emergent industries characterized 
by uncertainty develop their business model – including their rationale and consequences in terms of 
external financing and flexibility of the venture – we adopted an in-depth case-study approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), where ventures in emergent industries act as the unit of analysis. In the next 
section, we clarify the methodological approach adopted.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Case-study research has been advanced as the most adequate for developing fine-grained insights into 
real-time processes (Yin, 1994; Janesick, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). We retrospectively studied and 
analyzed six new ventures, specifically selected in view of our research question, thereby increasing 
external validity (Yin, 1994; Cook and Campbell, 1979). These six companies were active in various 
emergent industries. The main selection criterion was that they were all initially confronted with 
uncertainty regarding their business model (see Table 1)3. To this end, we used the definition of 
uncertainty by Schrader et al. (1993), as introduced in the previous section of this paper: a venture is 
confronted with uncertainty when its decision makers understand the structure of the problem (namely, 
the set of relevant business model components) but do not know the optimal values for some of these 
business-model components. 
                                                 
3 The names of the ventures in our case study have been changed for reasons of confidentiality. 
  9When engaging in case-study analysis, the use of a set of central constructs can be seen as 
beneficial (Pettigrew, 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989, Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). In this study, we 
investigate various approaches taken to business model development. We, therefore, document and 
interpret the concept of ‘business model’ as it changes over time. This construct stems directly from our 
research question and is hence specified a priori. We documented and analyzed changes in the 
following business model components: (1) product/service offering, (2) customer type (3) marketing, (4) 
distribution, (5) production (6) technology, and (7) organizational structure 4. This leads us to regard any 
observed combination of the five components listed above as one specific business model. If a 
company, at the same time, experiments with two or more such combinations, we regard these as 
different business models. Overall, the dimensions of our measurement correspond well to the 
definition by Morris et al. (2005), which in turn builds on a range of studies, implying content validity of 
our business model construct (Chandler & Lyon, 2001). 
Focused case-study research not only benefits from the use of central constructs but also implies 
different levels of analysis (Pettigrew, 1990, Pentland, 1999, Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). We first 
analyzed business model development in each venture. We then compared the development pattern 
over the six cases. To assure reliability of our findings, we used the following case study protocol (Yin, 
1994). In a first phase, a historical description of each company was created, based on the information 
from semi-structured interviews and document analysis (see Table 1). Documents – such as company 
websites, available business plans and, in some cases, e-mail correspondence – were read and 
analyzed in preparation for the interviews. In addition, complementary documents were provided by the 
interviewees after the interviews5. The resulting historical descriptions were presented to the 
                                                 
4 We chose to document precisely these constructs, based on the conclusion of the literature review by Morris et 
al. (2005) that the most prominent components of a business model are (a) the value proposition or offering, (b) 
the customer, (c) the economic factor, the revenue model or how the firm makes money, and (d) the internal 
processes and competencies. Components 4 through 7, as documented by us, jointly represent the internal 
processes and competencies. 
5 For each case, interviews and document analysis were performed until a consistent account of the case could 
be constructed. In the cases of @Music and OOPs, we encountered multiple inconsistencies between interviews 
and documents, which were then clarified by engaging in several additional interviews. 
  10interviewees in order to assess accuracy and completeness. In some cases, information was added, 
refined or corrected. We hence triangulated the documentation of the business model construct and 
involved key informants within each venture to review our historical descriptions, hereby increasing 
construct validity (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008; Yin, 1994). This analysis resulted in process maps 
for every venture as well as narrative descriptions of the entrepreneurial trajectory.  
 
-  INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  - 
 
In a second phase, these descriptions were used to conduct sequence analysis, which enables 
the identification of patterns in temporal data (Abbott, 1990; Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). Firstly, we 
defined an incident as a change in a venture’s business model. For the six cases, 20 incidents in total 
were identified; i.e. 20 moments in time when the business model changed. In a next step, all events 
were coded as introductions and/or abandonments of one or more business model. More precisely, for 
each event, we coded how many business models were added and how many were dropped. For each 
of the ventures, this coding was performed independently by two of the authors. Both authors identified 
the same 20 incidents. Of the 20 events, 17 were initially coded in the same way (i.e. as the exact 
same number of abandoned and introduced business models) by both authors, leading to an 85% inter-
rating reliability. The differences in coding were addressed through discussion and by obtaining 
additional information from the ventures resulting in consensus for all events in a second and final 
round. In a next phase, the number of introduced and abandoned business models per year, as well as 
the total number of business models per year, were mapped on a time-line for each venture. We then 
applied multidimensional scaling techniques to classify our six case studies.  
CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
  11Multidimensional scaling allows to explore similarities in data by locating items in a N-dimensional 
space (Kruskall and Wish, 1978; Young, 1987). Based on the number of abandoned business models 
and the total number of business models pursued in each year of the company’s existence, all cases 
under study have been situated in a two-dimensional space (R² = 0,76). As can be seen in Figure in 
Figure 1, four of the ventures (Music, OOPs, SiS, and RegMed) are very similar in terms of the number 
of business models they add each year (X-axis) and the total number of business models they use 
each year (Y-axis). Very early on, they select one (in the case of RegMed: two) business model(s) and 
stick to this decision for several years (between two and five years). Hence, these ventures opt for 
focus from inception onwards. In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to this approach as ‘focused 
commitment’. Figure 1 also indicates that the other two companies in our case study (Image and L-
goritm) do not fit this pattern. They differ strongly from focused ventures both with respect to the 
number of business models simultaneously pursued and the number of business models added. Based 
on the historical description and the sequence analysis, we see that they use a much more 
experimental approach in the first years of their existence. Whereas experimentation has been referred 
to in the literature as “a series of trial and error changes” (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000, p. 496), we find 
however that the experiments of these companies are not of a sequential nature. More precisely, we 
observe that these ventures evaluate a variety of business models simultaneously. They spend 
between two and five years building up a portfolio of business models, which they then gradually 
narrow down – abandoning the least promising experiments – until a small set of viable business 
models remains. We will refer to this approach as ‘simultaneous experimentation’. The main difference 
between L-goritm and Image pertains to the former starting out with a portfolio of business models that 
it develops further over time, while the latter begins with one single business model and creates a 
portfolio of different alternative business models thereafter. 
The identification of two clearly distinctive patterns is used as a starting point to further clarify the 
rationale, as well as the implications for external financing and for flexibility in terms of business model 
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in the next section are based on an in-depth analysis of all six cases. However, in order to increase the 
readability of the paper, we present only two case examples to clarify the constituents of both 
approaches: OOPs, which committed to one specific business model and L-goritm, which opted for 
simultaneous experimentation.  
-  INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  - 
 
Focused commitment 
We find that some ventures commit very early to one single business model and stick to this business 
model. In the case of OOPs (see Figure 2), the founders soon after inception in 1998 commit to the 
development of ‘Spoot’, a software product for B-to-C applications. Previous consulting activities are 
discontinued in 1999 in order to concentrate solely on product development and sales. Experienced 
sales people are hired. In 2000 – when sales are still not improving according to plan – a sales 
manager and additional salespeople are hired. The company develops a clear structure consisting of 
separate departments for sales, services, and R&D – with a clear division between R&D and services – 
thereby committing further to the initial business model. Even though many technical problems are 
encountered and sales do not materialize as planned, the company sticks to its business model (i.e. the 
development and sales of a product for B-to-C applications) until 2001.  
 
-  INSERT TEXT BOX 1 ABOUT HERE  - 
-  INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  - 
 
Rationale for focused commitment 
Early commitment for the ventures under study is not due to a lack of awareness in this respect; it is in 
fact a deliberate choice in the face of uncertainty. Founders and investors actually acknowledge at the 
  13start that many factors affecting the viability of the business model are uncertain; they decide 
nonetheless to commit early to the development of one specific and focused business model. In the 
case of OOPs, founders have developed profit-making service activities characterized by a low degree 
of uncertainty. However, they decide to focus solely on the development of a product for which 
technical and market viability remains to be proven.  
In our interviews, stakeholders mentioned two main reasons for committing to one specific 
business model despite the presence of uncertainty. Firstly, interviews with founders show that they 
commit early in order to build up learning effects and first-mover advantages. Secondly, our interviews 
with founders and investors further reveal that focused commitment improves the clarity of the value 
proposition for different stakeholders, including strategic partners, investors and employees. They 
believe this will enable them to convince stakeholders of the value of the business model, and this 
support will make the business model successful. 
 
Implications of focused commitment 
The choice of one specific business model results in clarity with regards to the organizational 
configuration of the venture. Objectives and activities are delineated in line with the value proposition 
adopted, and employees are attracted whose competencies reflect the objectives outlined in the 
business model envisaged. This results in functional structuration and formalization (see also Aldrich 
and Auster, 1986). OOPs organizes itself in functional departments, reinforces the sales organization 
with highly experienced people, and installs a clear division between R&D and sales. All these efforts 
imply significant expenditures and result in a consistent, dedicated, organizational configuration that 
reflects the business model adopted. Our case studies clearly show that external investors are willing to 
finance these significant expenditures. The external investors endorse focus and commitment in the 
belief and hope that it will allow ventures to achieve growth as fast as possible. They enter the 
  14investment agreement based on the company’s commitment to a specific business model. In the case 
of OOPs, the investors are actually pushing the founders to focus solely on product development. 
Over time, the chosen business model is developed and uncertainty pertaining to underlying 
assumptions is reduced. This process can yield outcomes ranging from full confirmation of initial 
assumptions to the complete opposite. While Solow (1996) demonstrated that early luck might have a 
persistent effect in terms of economical performance, in all our case studies, crucial assumptions turned 
out to be too optimistic. Our case studies show that, when ventures are confronted with the 
discrepancies between initial assumptions and the unfolding practices, change becomes inevitable for 
their survival. In line with the propositions advanced by Miller and Friesen (1984) and Gersick (1991), 
such change processes are of a radical nature. Redefining the business model requires changing the 
mindset of the entrepreneurial team and its stakeholders. It implies the choice of a different set of 
activities, skills and structures. Some of the developed competencies may become obsolete, while 
others may be missing. Moreover, our case studies confirm that convincing investors to fund radical 
reconfigurations is difficult, since these investors may query whether the initial business model was 
wrong or whether it was poorly executed (cfr. Bhide, 1992). In the case of OOPs, the founders of OOPs 
agree at the beginning of 2001 on the need to change the business model and to drastically restructure 
the venture by dismissing employees and reorganizing the different departments. However, they differ 
in their view on the right direction for the company to take and one of them leaves the company. The 
lack of sales and the departure of one of the founders weaken the confidence of the investors. One of 
the investors proposes a merger but the remaining founder does not agree. He initiates a business 




-  INSERT TEXT BOX 2 ABOUT HERE  - 
  15-  INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE  - 
 
We find that some ventures do not commit early to one specific business model but opt instead for a 
flexible approach by experimenting with multiple business models in parallel. In these cases, 
uncertainty is not only recognized but also explicitly translated into the initial business plan and into the 
venture’s approach to business model development. L-goritm (see Figure 3) initially experiments with 
radically different business models (different products and services, different market segments, different 
techniques, and various geographical markets) simultaneously. In 1995, the company offers software 
for reverse engineering, as well as services for quality control – and this in a variety of sectors. In 
addition, it experiments with a combination of indirect and direct sales during the period 1997-98.  
 
Rationale for simultaneous experimentation 
From interviews with stakeholders, we found that experiments are executed in parallel for two reasons. 
Firstly, engaging in different activities is seen as instrumental in spreading risk. If one business model 
proves unviable, there is still a chance that one of the other options turns out to be successful. In doing 
so, the ventures maintain a significant degree of strategic flexibility (Raynor, 2007). Secondly, this 
diversified approach allows ventures to learn about a relatively broad range of business models, and 
building up experience with a variety of business models is considered essential to achieve uncertainty 
reduction. Learning about one option can also reduce uncertainty about other options. We observe that 
the ventures use the knowledge acquired while exploring one option to re-assess and re-define the 
nature of, and the priorities for, the activity portfolio as a whole. L-goritm gathers knowledge and 
expertise from its service activities and – based on this experience – decides to add hardware 
components to its software offerings. Hence, ventures explicitly regard engagement in multiple activities 
as instrumental in re(de)fining their business models.  
 
  16Implications of simultaneous experimentation 
Our case-study findings show that some investors are willing to invest in ventures that explicitly 
acknowledge uncertainty and experiment with a variety of business models in parallel. L-goritm has the 
intention of developing software in the medium term but, from start-up, provides services that generate 
cash in the short term (need better example). The investors of L-goritm – when closing the investment 
agreement – are fully aware and supportive of the venture’s plan to experiment with various business 
models. Together with the venture, they monitor the progress for every business model experiment. 
They do not regard these experiments as resource-consuming incidents which need to be avoided, but 
as intelligent and necessary ways to select the most interesting entrepreneurial opportunity. However, 
even though investors are supportive of simultaneous experimentation, the development of multiple 
business models still poses challenges in terms of resource requirements. We find that ventures use 
various methods to keep total expenditures under control. Firstly, they use low-cost probing strategies 
(including experimental products and strategic alliances) to see what types of product and service 
markets are more responsive to (cfr. Brown and Eisenhardt; 1997, 1998). Secondly, they include 
business model experiments with short-term cash-generating potential. And in a conscious and planned 
manner, they try to enact spill-overs between the different activities undertaken. This is done by 
developing activities that can be re-used in different business model logics. L-goritm develops service 
activities to generate cash in the short term. In addition, these service activities provide the company 
with unexpected insights into the importance of hardware. They then use this knowledge to 
complement their product offerings. 
Simultaneous experimentation with a variety of business models implies that these 
entrepreneurial firms need to organize their activities accordingly. When looking at the organization of 
the venture when experimenting, a project-based configuration emerges, resembling the project-based 
nature of R&D departments. Such organic structures provide greater flexibility (Fiegenbaum and 
Karnani, 1991). During the first years, L-goritm’s founders take care of all business activities 
  17themselves. After a while, three employees are hired but the structure remains project oriented rather 
than functional. Over time, specific units are formed, each of them focusing on business models 
considered worthwhile pursuing.  
Since these ventures acknowledge that different conceivable business models are all 
characterised by uncertainty, the decision to commit to one option is postponed until more information 
with respect to a range of value propositions becomes available. As uncertainty is reduced, the range of 
business models is gradually narrowed down until a viable business model emerges. L-goritm gradually 
narrows down its range of activities between 1998 and 2001, and ends up with a successful business 
model. This portfolio reduction entails organizational changes. The ventures evolve from unstructured, 
loose configurations resembling the project-based nature of R&D departments to more elaborate 
structures, as the variety of business models is narrowed down. In the case of L-goritm, more 
employees are hired as the uncertainty regarding the business models’ viability is reduced and the 
variety of business models is narrowed down. A German company is taken over to fully implement the 
remaining viable business model.  
-  INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  - 
 
To sum up (see Table 2), focused commitment is a deliberate choice in the face of uncertainty 
because it holds the promise of realizing learning effects and first-mover advantages and because it is 
instrumental in mobilising different stakeholders, among whom investors figure prominently. It implies 
significant expenditures for the development of an organizational structure and the hiring of specialised 
personnel whose skills match the chosen business model. If, afterwards, initial assumptions on which 
the choice of the particular business model was based turn out to be incorrect, then adaptation efforts – 
needed for survival – will be of a radical nature. As our cases illustrate, such radical change processes 
are hazardous and painful. In order to achieve these radical changes, the venture needs to become 
flexible again as to its assumptions and its organizational configuration. Our case studies show that 
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of whether alternative scenarios are plausible and even preferred. And indeed, some of the ventures in 
our case study were found to use a different approach, experimenting with multiple business models in 
parallel. Simultaneous experimentation can be seen as a way to address uncertainty, by learning about 
a broad range of potential business models. These ventures opt for a project-based organization, 
deploy low-cost probing strategies, include business model experiments with short-term cash-
generating potential, and enact spill-overs in order to maintain total expenditures within reasonable 
limits. The latter is achieved by developing activities that can be re-used within the framework of 
different business models. Our case studies show that at least some external investors are willing to 
invest in planned simultaneous experimentation and that they monitor progress for each business 
model experiment. As a result of simultaneous experimentation, uncertainty is reduced with respect to a 
range of business models. This uncertainty reduction facilitates the gradual narrowing-down of the 
range of options until a viable business model is found. 
 
CHOOSING BETWEEN APPROACHES: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
Now that we have identified the use of two different approaches to business model development in 
emergent industries that are both able to convince external investors, an obvious question is which 
model is more appropriate. In this section, we therefore develop an analytical framework to generate 
propositions regarding the appropriateness of focused commitment versus simultaneous 
experimentation. We consider a model more appropriate if it is able to yield higher levels of expected 
profits compared with its counterpart.  
Our case studies reveal that some technology-based ventures in emergent markets commit early 
to one specific business model and put in place an organizational configuration aimed at the 
implementation of this business model. By fully developing the chosen business model, uncertainty 
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radical change of the business model becomes inevitable for the venture’s survival. Significant efforts 
and investments are then needed to dispose of organizational structures, ideas and competencies that 
have become obsolete, and to persuade investors to invest in the creation of new, more appropriate 
arrangements and competencies. Hence, the expected profit from focused commitment for the initial 
period in the life of a venture can be formulated as follows:  
p * MaxTurnover(focused) - FullLaunchCost + (1-p) * (MinTurnover(focused)  - ReconfCost)   
where      p = the probability of success for a specific business model 
MaxTurnover(focused) = the turnover for a successful business model that is fully 
implemented 
FullLaunchCost = the cost to fully implement one specific business model 
MinTurnover(focused)  = the turnover for an unsuccessful business model that is fully 
implemented.  
ReconfCost = the cost of abruptly reorienting the business when the initial business model 
turns out to be unsuccessful 
 
If we assume that MinTurnover(focused) = 0, this formula can be re-formulated as follows:  
p * MaxTurnover(focused) - FullLaunchCost + (1-p) * (0 - ReconfCost)  
or p * MaxTurnover(focused)  - FullLaunchCost - (1-p) * ReconfCost        (a) 
 
While significant reconfiguration costs arise when a venture commits to a specific business model 
that proves to be unsuccessful, this is not the case when ventures experiment with a variety of business 
models in parallel. These entrepreneurial firms postpone the choice of a single option until more 
information with respect to a range of value propositions becomes available. As a consequence, they 
organize their activities on a project basis rather than developing a focused organizational 
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experiment fails. Hence, the expected profit from simultaneous experimentation for one period in the life 
of a venture can be formulated in the following way: 
Σi:1→n [ p * MaxTurnover(unfocused)  +  (1-p) * MinTurnover(unfocused)    - ExperimentCost] 
where   n= number of experiments 
p = the probability of success for a specific business model 
MaxTurnover(unfocused) = the turnover for a successful business model experiment 
MinTurnover(unfocused) =the turnover for an unsuccessful business model experiment.  
ExperimentCost = the cost for one specific business model experiment 
 
If we assume that MinTurnover(unfocused)  = 0, this formula can be re-formulated as follows: 
Σi:1→n [ p * MaxTurnover(unfocused)  +  (1-p) * 0  - ExperimentCost] 
or n * [ p * MaxTurnover(unfocused)    -  ExperimentCost]      (b) 
 
From comparing formulas (a) and (b), insights can be obtained about whether and under which 
conditions simultaneous experimentation is to be preferred over focused commitment. As formula (c) 
clarifies, this is the case when:  
p*MaxTurnover(focused)   - FullLaunchCost - (1-p)*ReconfCost    < n * [ p*MaxTurnover(unfocused)  - 
ExperimentCost] (c) 
 
Based on our case studies, we found that ventures committing to one specific business model 
regard learning effects and first-mover advantages as the main driver for early commitment (cfr. Choi et 
al., 2008). They hope that commitment will allow the venture to achieve growth as rapidly as possible. 
In the absence of learning effects, it is reasonable to assume that the turnover of one successful, fully 
implemented business model is equal to the total turnover of a variety of ‘n’ successful business model 
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turnover. However, if learning effects exist, a fully implemented business model will yield a higher 
turnover than ‘n’ parallel experiments. Putting all efforts into one single business model will raise the 
potential turnover. Hence: 
MaxTurnover(focused)  =   F * n * MaxTurnover(unfocused)  where F≥1 (and F>1 in case of learning 
effects)     (d) 
 
When comparing the cost of fully launching a business model with that of parallel 
experimentation, we should note that the ventures in our case study deliberately use low-cost probing 
strategies (including experimental products, futurists, and strategic alliances) to see what types of 
product and service markets are more responsive to (cfr. Brown and Eisenhardt; 1997, 1998), and that 
they combine different activities through which synergies can be created. In addition, we know from 
existing literature that experiments can be less costly than full implementation of a new idea or 
business model. This can be formulated as follows: 
ExperimentCost = 1/x * FullLaunchCost   where x ≥ 1  
(and x>1 if the cost of an experiment is smaller than that of a fully launched business model)  (e) 
 
When substituting equations (d) and (e) in formula (c), we find that simultaneous experimentation 
is preferable to focused commitment if  
p*MaxTurnover(focused)  - (1-p)*ReconfCost  - FullLaunchCost  < n*[ p*1/F*1/n *MaxTurnover(focused)  - 
1/x*FullLaunchCost] 
⇔  p*MaxTurnover(focused)  - (1-p)*ReconfCost  - FullLaunchCost  < p*1/F*MaxTurnover(focused)    -  n/x 
*FullLaunchCost 
⇔ p * (1- 1/F) *MaxTurnover(focused)  <   (1-p) * ReconfCost  +  [1-(n/x)] * FullLaunchCost   
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simultaneous experimentation are appropriate. Firstly, the latter becomes more appealing if 1/F is high, 
i.e. if learning effects and first-mover advantages are small. Recent research has clearly shown that 
first-mover advantages are indeed extremely limited in emergent industries (Dowell and Swaminathan, 
2006). Firms that enter an emergent industry earliest have the longest life expectancy but their 
advantage lasts only until the dominant design emerges. Early entrants face inertial pressures that 
make them less likely to accomplish and survive the transition to this dominant design (see also 
Abernathy and Utterback, 1975). Secondly, parallel experimentation becomes more interesting if costs 
associated with reconfiguring the venture (ReconfCost) are high; i.e. if the cost of abruptly reorienting a 
focused, committed venture, when the initial business model turns out to be unsuccessful, is high. Our 
case studies show that these reconfiguration costs are in fact relatively high. Significant efforts and 
investments are needed to change the mindset of all stakeholders – including investors – and to 
replace or reconfigure organizational structures, ideas and competencies in order to effectively develop 
the newly adopted business model. According to Loch, Solt and Bailey (2008), “…the VC investment 
process… tends to penalize the new venture when it misses its targets rather than nurturing it through a 
re-definition” (see also Bhide, 1992). Failure jeopardizes trust, which plays a key role in company 
formation (Kohtamäki, Kekäle and Viitala, 2004). Thus, radical change processes are indeed hazardous 
and painful. Thirdly, from the mathematical formulas above, we see that simultaneous experimentation 
becomes preferable if n/x is low, i.e. if the cost difference between a portfolio of ‘n’ experiments and 
one full implementation is low or, in other words, if low-cost probing is possible and/or synergies can be 
created from different experiments in the portfolio (as was the case in the companies under study). 
Finally, simultaneous experimentation becomes more attractive if p, i.e. the probability of success for a 
specific business model is low. It is well known that this is the case in emergent industries. Very few 
configurations survive competition, and the number of firms drops drastically as a dominant design 
emerges (Abernathy and Utterback, 1975). Hence, it appears that, in emergent industries, most 
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approach to business model development.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we generated insights into how growth-oriented new ventures in emergent industries 
approach the development of a viable business model. Based on our case studies, we were able to 
document how and why commitment and experimentation are pursued in new ventures. Observing 
ventures that commit early to one single business model comes as no surprise; in contrast, the 
occurrence of ventures opting for simultaneous experimentation, i.e. trying out multiple business 
models in parallel, is less straightforward. These ventures spend between two and five years 
developing a portfolio of business models, which is gradually narrowed down until one, or a limited set 
of viable business models, remains. We hence clearly find that experimentation is not limited to the 
sequential template advanced in the existing literature, but can take on the form of simultaneous efforts. 
Moreover, an analytical comparison of both approaches clearly suggests that simultaneous 
experimentation with multiple business models is more appropriate when entering emergent markets.  
Although our case studies confirm that ventures consider commitment to be useful for persuasion 
in situations of uncertainty, they furthermore show that ventures opting for the simultaneous 
experimentation approach were also able to attract external investors. These investors are supportive 
of planned and simultaneous experimentation efforts and are willing to engage in entrepreneurial 
ventures that experiment with a portfolio of business models. They deviate from the traditional, focused 
approach, where ‘investors… prefer ventures with plausible, carefully though-out plans to address well-
defined markets’ (Bhide, 1992). Our findings indicate that some VCs regard planned simultaneous 
experimentation as an intelligent approach for selecting the most interesting business model. The fact 
that VCs are willing to invest in ventures opting for simultaneous experimentation is important, since it is 
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and McDougall-Covin, 2009; Jääskelaïnen, Maula and Seppä., 2006). Without their support, companies 
would not be able to opt for a simultaneous experimentation approach. 
Our finding that external investors are supportive of planned and simultaneous experimentation 
efforts complements the work of Bhide (1992), who advanced the notion of bootstrapping, i.e. launching 
ventures with modest personal funds as a flexible alternative to using external capital. Bootstrapping 
poses problems in the sense that investment possibilities during the first phase of the venture are 
limited, if present at all, and that growth thus needs to be under strict control. If ventures adopting a 
simultaneous experimentation approach to business model development are able to attract investors, 
then flexible entries of a more capital-intensive nature become feasible in emergent industries. Hence, 
simultaneous experimentation possesses the advantage but not the disadvantage of bootstrapping and 
seems especially relevant for entries into industries that require considerable initial investments. 
On a more conceptual level, our work contributes to the lively discussion on causation and 
effectuation. Sarasvathy (2001) discussed the relevance of causation and effectuation processes for 
the creation of new firms. Causation processes imply that entrepreneurs choose specific means (a 
specific organizational structure, specific employee skills, etc.) to create a desired effect (such as a 
specific business model). Effectuation processes, on the other hand, imply that a set of means is taken 
as given and the focus is on selecting between possible effects that can be created with this set of 
means. Whereas existing work has discussed effectuation as cognition or logic, research on how 
effectual logic translates into effectual behaviour is scarce (exceptions are work in progress by Fisher, 
2008 and Mauer, 2008). We believe that the simultaneous experimentation approach identified in our 
case studies follows an effectual logic and can be regarded as closely related to effectual behaviour. In 
an effectual logic, the basis for taking action is means-driven; investment decisions are based on a 
commitment limit in terms of affordable loss, and the direction of development is highly influenced by 
stakeholders and by unforeseen events that are leveraged into new options (Mauer, 2008; Read et al., 
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approach start from their initial idea, capabilities and contacts to develop multiple business models. 
Specific business models are added to the portfolio based on contacts with suppliers, customers and 
other partners, and based on information gathered in the course of business-model experiments. A 
simultaneous experimentation approach therefore follows an effectual logic, since it takes a set of 
means as given and focuses on selecting between possible effects that can be created with this set of 
means. Whereas simultaneous experimentation implies the recognition of required change and 
adaptation, focused commitment, on the other hand, follows a causal logic where specific means (a 
specialised organizational structure, specialised personnel, and significant expenditures) are chosen to 
create a desired effect (namely, the implementation of one specific business model)6.  
Finally, our findings also suggest a reconciliation of the notions of ‘action’ and ‘planning’. In 
Sarasvathy’s earlier work (Sarasvathy, 2001) the effectuation logic is partly driven by chance or 
coincidence. “Whoever first buys […] becomes, by definition, the first target customer. By continually 
listening to the customer and building an ever-increasing network of customers and strategic partners, 
the entrepreneur can then identify a workable segment profile” (Sarasvathy, 2001, p. 247). Also other 
authors have attributes an important role for ‘luck’ in the creation of entrepreneurial opportunities 
(Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Arthur, 1989). However, we find that the ventures in our case study 
adopting a simultaneous experimentation approach do not just ‘go with the flow’. Instead, they 
deliberately plan and develop multiple business model experiments. Contrary to the juxtaposition of 
‘planning’ and ‘action’ by Liao and Gartner (2006) and the contrast between ‘planning’ and ‘learning’ in 
management literature in general (e.g. Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 1998), our findings suggest 
that planning and the development of a portfolio of business model experiments are not opposites but 
can instead be reconciled. Sarasvathy (2001) suggested that, when the future is uncertain, effectual 
                                                 
6 Note that commitment does not necessarily imply only one business model. Pursuing several business models 
over longer time frames is also an option for ventures (see also Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008, on portfolio 
entrepreneurship). However, such a diversified or portfolio approach multiplies the resource implications 
introduced by commitment and, hence, can be seen as less relevant for launching an entrepreneurial venture in 
an emergent industry. 
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action) is beneficial under uncertainty. Our research overcomes this apparent contradiction by 
proposing that simultaneous experimentation – which implies planning combined with entrepreneurial 
action - is appropriate when confronted with uncertainty. 
In discussing our research, some limitations should, of course, be kept in mind. The main 
objective of the paper relates to investigating processes of business model development within 
entrepreneurial ventures in emergent industries. Our findings suggest a third model, besides focused 
commitment and sequential experimentation. It goes without saying that further engagement in in-depth 
case studies may result in additional insights with respect to both the constituents of different models 
and the delineation of additional models.  
In addition, while our analytical framework clearly suggests that a simultaneous experimentation 
approach seems more appropriate than focused commitment, further empirical research on the 
performance effects of these different approaches to venture development seems highly relevant. Such 
impact assessment not only requires translating our case study findings into an adequate panel-
oriented research design (e.g. De Carolis et al., 2009), but also taking into account success factors 
identified by previous research, such as industry characteristics (Klevorick et al., 1995; Marsili, 2002; 
Shane, 2001), characteristics of the founding team (Delmar and Shane, 2006; Kirzner, 1997), 
legitimacy (Delmar and Shane, 2004) and available assets such as financial resources, patents, 
alliances, geographical location (DeCarolis and Deeds, 1999; Lerner, 1994). Finally, our research also 
points to the relevance of further research into the role and impact of investors: when and why are 
(some) investors more open to support simultaneous experimentation? To what extent do ventures 
pursuing simultaneous experimentation affect the overall performance of VC investment portfolios? VCs 
usually spread their risk by investing in focussed ventures with opposite business models. Whereas 
simultaneous experimentation spreads the risk within the venture, the fact that business models are 
  27constantly evolving may make it difficult for investors to balance different investments. We hope this 
research contribution will inspire future efforts in this area.  
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Company  Activity  Uncertainty at founding  Data sources  Time period 
Music  E-commerce  awareness of critical issues such as impact of internet on 
individuals’ buying behavior, musical genres, 
geographical scope 
however, rate of diffusion unknown 
e-mail correspondence, meeting 
reports, financial reports, business 
plans, 11 interviews with investors, 
founders and employees 
Jan 1999 – July 2001 
OOPs  SW Products that 
enable E-
commerce 
implicit assumption that B-to-C will be considerable 
market 
unawareness of the discrepancy between standardized 
solution and real settings, of the distribution approach, of 
market interest in B-to-B 
business plans, 6 interviews with one 
investor, one consultant, one 
employee and two founders (one was 
interviewed twice) 
Jan 1998 – Feb 2003 
Image Machine  Vision 
Systems 
difficult to estimate size of market and sub-segments 
high number of applications in different industries 
possible but unclear which one is best 
business plans, , website, 2 
interviews with 2 former CEOs 




unawareness of relevance of sales approach, position 
HW producers, geographical scope 
business plans, , website, 3 
interviews with founder/CEO, 1 
interview with co-founder, 1 interview 
with finance manager 




high expectations but also high uncertainty regarding 
impact of internet on individuals’ buying behavior 
high uncertainty regarding market potential 
lack of knowledge of international marketing and lack of 
knowledge of fierce competition on home market 
business plans, website, 2 interviews 
with founder 




lack of market knowledge 
uncertain results of clinical studies 
business plans, website, 2 interviews 
with founder/CEO 
Jan 2000 – Jan 2005 
 
TABLE 1: Case study overview TABLE 2: Summary of main findings 




























    commit to one business model during 
the initial phase of the venture 
 
  experiment with multiple business models 













  promise of achieving learning effects 
and first-mover advantages 
  clarity of business model results in 
increased mobilizing power (towards 
investors and other stakeholders) 
 
  seen as a way to learn about a broad 
range of business models and to spread 
risk 
  learning about one option can also reduce 
uncertainty about other business models 






























    implies the development of a 
specialized, dedicated organizational 
structure, resulting in considerable 
expenditures 
  when assumptions do not become 
reality, change will be of a radical nature 
 
  uncertainty reduction facilitates the 
gradual narrowing-down of the range of 
experiments until a viable business model 
is found 
  implies the development of a project-
based organization of flexible employees; 
which becomes more elaborate and 
structured as portfolio is gradually 



























    external investors are convinced by 
focused business model 
  external investors are unwilling to 
finance radical change when business 
model turns out to be unviable 
 
  implies the use of low-cost probing 
strategies, inclusion of business models 
with short-term cash-generating potential, 
and/or resource spill-overs between 
different business models 
  external investors are convinced of the 
usefulness of planned, simultaneous 
experimentation. They monitor progress 























































































































2000  01/01  12/01  07/02 
Two activities: 
-  Services that 
generate cash 










Technology: Object oriented 
programming 
Product: consulting and custom 
SW development 
Customer: lab in LIMS field + 
Belgian bank 
 
Product:  customized 
solution for catalogue 
and document 
exchange 
Customer: focus solely 
on construction sector 
Organization: 
departmental structure 
Time  01/98 
Product: consulting 
services + R&D ‘proof 
of concept’ project,  
Organization: 3 
researchers hired for 
’proof of concept’ 
 
Product: consulting 
services + Idea to 
develop product 
supporting B-to-C 
sales through internet 
Technology: object 
oriented programming 
Product: development of product 
‘Spoot’ (consisting of functional 
modules 
 + does not function in real settings = 
20/80 problem) + shift in attention and 
resources from consulting to product 
development  
Marketing: unsuccessful trial of sales 
through partnering; then try direct sales 
to IT managers with significant sales 
expenditures 
Organization: recruitment of sales 
persons 
 
Product: Identification of 20/80 problem 
leads to decision to sell solutions 
based on technical iso functional 
modules, to no longer mention the 
product name, and to shift from B-to-C 
to B-to-B  
Marketing: listen iso push + negotiate 
with management and commercial 
department iso with IT department 
Customer: defined as national 
companies, with IT-department and 
large budget; no specific sectors 
targeted 
Organization: sales team fired + 
marketing team responsible for sales 
 
Product: tender to 
develop web-enabled 










R&D and sales 
Organization: 
Founders start 
evaluating lack of 
sales in depth by 










services + 'proof of 
concept’ is 
promising, but has 
various 
shortcomings; 





Spoot fizzles out 
Production: division 
between R&D and 
service department 
abandoned 
Focus solely on product business model 
-  abandon consulting services 
-  no experimentation with other business models 
 
One radical change: refocus w.r.t. 
product + application + distribution and 
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End 
2001 
Technology: acquired German sensor 
technology is gradually incorporated leading 
to Product/service: complete HW/SW offering 
of QC products and QC services (decreased 
focus on RE) 
Marketing: only direct sales i.s.o. through 
OEMs/indirect dealer networks; higher prices 
Customer: focus on Germany and US 




Product/service: offering mainly services for quality control 
(QC) to generate quick revenues + developing and first sales 
of software for quality control (QC) + developing and first 
sales of software for reverse engineering (RE) 
Customer: variety of sectors (no automotive); local 
customers 
Organization: 4 employees 
Technology: nothing left of initial technology 
Product/service: RE SW+ QC services 
Customer: variety of sectors (first contacts with automotive 
sector through HW producers showing value attributed to 
HW by customers and closer contact of HW producers 
with customers); QC services local + RE SW world-wide 
Marketing: direct sales for QC services + indirect dealer 
network for RE SW + but first signs that indirect sales not 
suited to build up reference accounts 
Organization: 3 new R&D employees + limited structure + 
building up sales/ management/marketing experience 
 
European project out of funding + 
Company founded by 2 founders with 
intention to become a product company: 
Product/service: software for reverse 
engineering (RE) 
Customer: variety of sectors (no 
automotive) 
Organization: founders do sales, 
engineering, after sales, and technology 
development 
Organization: European 
project at Leuven 
university lab 
Technology: development 
of algorithms for 
reconstructing laser 








Acquisition of German 






Technology: R&D shifts from RE to QC 
Product/service: RE SW+ QC services + take-
over of SW company planned but abandoned 
+ decision to become active in HW 
Marketing: direct sales for QC services + 
indirect dealer network AND direct sales 
through local commercial offices for RE SW 





Technology: development of 
SW for verification completed 
Product/service: focus on 
standardised products for QC 
Customer: focus on automotive; 
focus on Germany and US 
Marketing: only direct sales 
 
Gradually narrowing portfolio until successful business model is found, i.e.: 
-  Complete HW/SW offering 
-  Standardized products for QC 
-  Direct sales 
-  Germany and US 
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Portfolio of activities: 
Experimenting at the same time with different products and services, 
different market segments, different distribution techniques in 
different geographical markets 
 





































Time TEXT BOX 1: The story of OOPs 
 
The story of OOPs 
 
OOPs is established in January 1998 by two founders who have consulting experience in providing customized 
software services based on object-oriented programming. Initially, the venture continues these profitable 
consulting activities. However, soon after its founding, the idea emerges to develop – through object-oriented 
programming - a product that can support the development of applications for online B-to-C sales. Part of the 
necessary funding to develop a 'proof of concept' is obtained from a governmental organization. The company 
starts to make losses as a direct result of investment in this research. At the end of the research project, the 
concept proves promising, although the structure of the prototype and the different components show various 
shortcomings. 
In mid-1999, the company decides nevertheless to develop the concept into a product and starts looking 
for investors. In total, €0.5 million of external capital is attracted from a financial institution and a private investor. 
With this capital injection, a product is developed that consists of different functional modules. A major problem 
soon arises during this period: the product offers an 80% solution for the customer's problem but adapting the 
product to solve the other 20% is more expensive than developing a customized product starting from scratch. 
This problem has not been recognized at the time, and will later be referred to as the 20/80 problem. At the same 
time, the capital injection is used to develop marketing and sales. Experienced sales people are hired, bringing 
the total number of personnel to about 15. Here also, an important problem arises. Test projects to sell the 
product remain unsuccessful. Despite these problems, investors support further commitment to the product 
activities. The profitable consulting activities are discontinued and efforts are redirected towards product 
development, in order to obtain learning effects and first-mover advantages in the internet market. 
By mid-2000, the €0.5 million is spent, and an additional €0.1 million  is invested by the financial 
institution and by a VC company. A new business plan is written, and external auditors value the company’s 
product activities at €15 million. Technical improvements are made but the fundamental 20/80 problem remains 
unsolvable and unrecognized, and sales efforts still fail to reach targets. Investors believe that sales can be 
improved by hiring an experienced sales manager and a sales team of about 20 people. The company now has 
a clear structure, consisting of separate departments for sales, service, and R&D, with a clear division between 
R&D and services. Despite these structural changes and large expenditures, sales fail to improve. 
At the beginning of 2001, the company founders start to evaluate sales results in depth. They conclude 
that the company's sales approach is wrong and recognize the 20/80 problem. It is decided that from now on 
negotiations will take place with the management and commercial department of potential clients instead of with 
their IT department, since the former are expected to be aware of the 'real' problems, whereas IT people are 
considered to be more concerned with technicalities. Although product development continues, the company no 
longer advertises products but 'solutions', consisting of technical modules based on existing capabilities and 
software. Because the interest in B-to-C solutions is smaller than expected, the company also decides to refocus 
on solutions for B-to-B commerce. Based on sales visits, the company founders define their target customers, 
namely national companies with an IT department and a minimum turnover of €25 million. The sales manager 
and his entire sales team are fired. The former marketing team assumes responsibility for sales. In December 
2001, product development fizzles out. The distinction between ‘R&D department’ and ‘service department’ is 
abandoned, and all developers start working directly for the customer.  
By July 2002, sales have grown somewhat (especially services and integration) but remain low. All 
efforts have shifted to the construction sector, where a consortium of players shows interest in catalogue and 
document exchange applications. However, due to decision-making problems within the consortium of potential 
customers, sales do not materialize. The founders now differ in their view on the right direction for the company 
and one founder leaves the company. This weakens the confidence of the investors, one of whom proposes that 
OOPs merges with another company in its investment portfolio. The remaining founder does not agree, however. 
At the start of 2003, he writes a proposal for a government tender to develop a web-enabled database of cultural 
events. The government is interested but asks the board of directors to confirm their support. The investors have 
however lost confidence and do not want to make this kind of official statement. The founder realizes that the 
company is not viable without the other investors’ confidence. He resigns and OOPs files for bankruptcy.  
 
  40TEXT BOX 2: The story of L-goritm 
 
The story of L-goritm 
 
Originating from a European research project at the University of Leuven, L-goritm is founded at the end of 1995 
by two researchers as a university spin-off. The initial intention of the company is to be a product company, 
delivering software for reverse engineering to a variety of sectors. However, during the period 1995-97, its main 
activities are offering services for quality control, since this generates quick cash. Some reverse engineering 
services are offered. These services are offered to local customers – often reached through university contacts –  
in a variety of sectors (hospitals, providers of engineering services, producers of furniture, shoes, molds, candy, 
consumer electronics, etc.). Although L-goritm is working on the development of software for reverse engineering 
and realises its first sales in this area, the software for quality control is completed first as support for L-goritm’s 
service activities.  
At the end of 1997, an indirect dealer network is set up for the distribution of quality control software as 
well as some reversed engineering software. A partnership is forged with dealers who distribute the L-goritm 
software all over the world (incl. Taiwan, Korea, Singapore) to a variety of sectors. This partnership allows L-
goritm to learn about and to copy parts of their management, marketing know-how and strategy. Revenues 
increase. In the meantime, L-goritm is still selling services for quality control (and some reverse engineering 
services) in Belgium. Through hardware producers (especially producers of scanning material), L-goritm comes 
into contact for the first time with foreign automotive constructors. In 1998, the business model is extended to 
direct sales by setting up local commercial offices because the indirect approach has proven to be less suitable 
to build up reference accounts. In addition, R&D efforts are directed to point-cloud-based verification for quality 
control instead of reverse engineering. However, there is still considerable service activity. These additional 
activities lead to very good financial results in 1998. 
A take-over of a software company is planned but is abandoned later on. From contacts with hardware 
producers and from its service activities, L-goritm has found, firstly, that customers attribute considerable value to 
the hardware, even though software is in reality the most important for total performance and, secondly, that 
hardware producers are in closer contact with the customer. Therefore, L-goritm decides to become active in 
hardware activities as well, since this will allow them to be in close contact with the customer, to offer a total 
solution, and therefore to reach the total available customer budget without having to negotiate with hardware 
producers on division of the profit. In 1999, L-goritm acquires a German company specialised in the development 
of optical measuring equipment. This makes a complete product offering of SW and HW possible, in addition to 
SW sales and HW sales. In 2000, the management obtains a government loan to buy out shareholders who had 
swapped shares in the German acquisition. The acquired technology is gradually integrated, leading to a 
complete offering of software and sensors. The company is EBITDA break-even for the first time. During the 
period 1999-2000, after the German acquisition, it is decided to sell directly instead of through OEMs, to sell at 
higher prices, and to sell mainly to the US and Germany, thereby reducing geographical diversification. By mid- 
2001, the development of standardised software products for quality control is completed, and the automotive 
sector is chosen as the main target segment. No more R&D or sales efforts are carried out in the area of reverse 
engineering, which constitutes a negligible part of total turnover (about 5%).The first two quarters of 2001 show a 
70% growth in revenue compared to the same quarters in 2000, and a positive net profit. The total headcount is 
30. 
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